Naravno da imam argumente. Ali kako ih ni ti ne iznosiš nego se bez smisla i reda hrpu nepovezanih izvora koji su “neovisni” a zapadni i pušu u rog Putinu, ne vidim razlog zbog kojeg bi ih ja morao iznositi. Prilagodiš raspravu sugovorniku. Ako ti biraš “novinare” koji su agronomi i MMA borci i sve samo ne novinari, i linkaš videozapise bez komentara koji bi bez problema mogli gostovati kod pokojnog Malnara da im Ševa bude domaćin ili pak imati u vlastitoj produkciji “krim tim 2”, što da ti opovrgavam?

Kad sam ti napisao davno prije u onoj drugoj temi koja je bila jednako kontroverzna da su Rusi zadnji put u Europu ulazili tenkovima šutio si i vikao da je Sputnik V siguran i da ne bi Putin svoje vojnike cijepio njime.

Nemam ja problem sa Srbima ni crncima ni Jevrejima ni Bošnjacima. Imam problem s narativom koji koristiš bez ijednog provjerljivog argumenta u kojem postoji “naš novinar” koji to nije, novinarka (koja to je ali “nije naša” pa je prihvatljivo) ali je i model na pisti na zapadu.

I sve bi to bilo super da to ne radiš usput i površno dok zapravo radiš nešto sasvim drugo i da se držiš nekog reda i smisla u svom narativu i ideji i teorijama. Ovako nabadaš čim se negdje te “uhvati” kako nisi naveo izvor ili ti je izvor netočan. A sve na “kratki rok” i s “naknadnom pameti”. I onda ide “nova teorija” koja je još manje vjerojatna i novi logički salto mortale.

Ali eto, to je demokracija. Svačije (pa i moje) pravo da bude javno glup. I stručan. I trgovac.

Daleko sam ja od savršenog i ako tako gledamo, mogu se složiti da sva ta "površnost" onda daje manju težinu mojim informacijama, i to je ok, nemam s time problem. Ja razne informacije pohvatam "u letu" i brzo ih prenesem jer mi se učini zanimljivo i daje pogled iz druge perspektive na cijelu situaciju. Niti tvrdim da je jedno istina niti drugo, to su teme za raspravu.

Neki ljudi će to pročitati i vidjeti da je tek neprovjerni "hint", a evo Daddo je to kasnije lijepo provjereno argumentirao na drugi način - i sve štima, dapače, i ja ću biti zadovoljan što se neka stvar razjasni. No, ako ti na moju neprovjerenu informaciju možeš uzvratiti samo isto toliko neprovjerenom, a onda usputno napadneš mene, onda mi je to bezveze i nije podloga za išta smisleno do fejsbuksaškog prepucavanja.

Jesam li ja i u jednom trenu ad hominem krenuo u ovom forumu na tebe - ili bilo koga drugog? Vjerujem da nisam. Netko nešto iznese, netko drugi ospori izneseno i to je demokratska rasprava. Prelazak na blaćenje druge strane van teme rasprave nije ok.

Evo samo to.

Normalno je da u ovako ekstremnim situacijama kao što je rat svi budemo ekstra emotivni i polarizirani i ne baš sasvim svoji. Sve je to ljudski, ali zadržimo tu neku razinu komunikacije, znam da možemo!

Misliš na ad hominem kao onda kad si “iznio dojam” gdje sam ja rastao sa “zlatnom žlicom” a ti si mali Majk? I onda velebno zaključio “zato Zapad ne razumije Putina” na račun toga?

Meni moja pokojna baka znala reć (ona kod koje smo svinje klali, btw) - znaš sinek, ni ti baš dobro pravit se stalno i dugo blesaf, mogel bi takvi i ostat.

A ne mislim da si intelektualno potkapacitiran netko koji nije u stanju argumentirat bolje od ovih linkova koje staviš kad uloviš vremena niti da ne čitaš i ne pamtiš stvari iz prošlosti. Nije ti Kim domet. Ni onaj powerlifter agronom. Zašto uporno spuštaš raspravu na level “noćne more”, “lizaljke” i “normalnofobije” znaš samo ti.

Opet južina udarila

Kada s odmakom pogledaš, nije Malnarova "Noćna mora" bila spuštanje u nešto lažno, dapače, često su oni tamo govorili više istine od službenih medija. To su iznosli na svoj osebujan način, ali nije bilo tamo baš nekih "fake newsa".

Tako je i sada jednim dijelom bilo s pandemijom (što se tek sada sudski moralo dokazati), a isto je i u ratu kada propaganda s obje strane "melje". Zato su mediji koji nisu tzv. MSM, itekako bitni, pogotovo kao "leadovi" na vijesti koje MSM ignorira ili čak otvoreno laže o njima.

Bez obzira što je takve izvore često teško provjeriti, ima smisla čuti i te informacije. A ovo što sam ja ostavio, nije baš "bezvezan" izvor, čovjek koji je bio UN-ov inspektor za oružje i bivši US obavještajac. Volio bih čuti nekoga s druge strane tko demantira njegovu argumentaciju. U tu svrhu sam to i ostavio ovdje.

Bertone kaže:

Ja baš ovu ne osjećam.
Ne mogu ti opisati kako je to kada konačno nisam protagonist ili antagonist, već puki promatrač u priči.
Ovo je veličanstveno.
Sada znam kako su se osjećali ovi iz UNPROFOR-a 90-ih.

Bertone kaže:


Nije samo južina i Plenkoviću je rođendan pa slavimo malo. Balticom sam malo kalal po dvorišču. Dva piceka su na ražnju završila. Žena kamom rastrančirala prije. Takve su One kojima nije problem bio u polje.

... a sutra je i praznik

…a nekima i preksutra. #ProduženiVikendFTW.

I ja se bavim vrtom već danima. Zapustili ga, pa prvo čupanje raslinja, pa korova, pa štihanje, sutra grabljanje i tako.
Svaki dan ponešto...
Zasadili dvije lavande, jedan ružmarin i neki pitaj Boga nešto cvijet...
Meni je samo cvijet izgledao kao bijela ruža, ali nije ruža.

... i tako na sva 3,5 m²

A nije baš.
Nekih 20 m2, pa je tu puteljak sa sredinom gdje je stol i dvije klupe, nasuprot malo manji dio od 16m2 zemlje - to je iza kuće, a kraj toga vrta je i garaža.
Pa imam dvorište klasik gdje su one ploče išle kada je voda pukla i ispred kuće manji vrt, tamo su ruže i te spike.
To nije sagrađeno 90-ih pa naovamo.
Mislim, nije princip "betoniraj zgradu tako da ti ostane sa svake strane 3m2 prostora od kompletnog zemljišta" - kako se u mom kvartu gradilo od 90-ih pa sve naovamo.
Tada se gledalo da ti kuća zauzima 50 % ukupnog prostora, a dvorište isto toliko ako ne i malo više.
Kasne 30-e, točnije 1938.
Čovjek građevinac gradio za sebe, svi kažu da ima "dobre kosti".
Doduše, ima mane...
Kakav beton.
Kakva armatura!

Da se maknem sa offtopica, zadnjih dana primjećujem da niti ovaj rat ipak ne može skulirati državnike EU zemalja da se ne kefaju.
Pa ako se sada neće držati zajedno, koliko god ovo trajalo - kada će se držati zajedno?
www.vecernji.hr/vijesti/macron-uzvratio-...omaze-le-pen-1577458
Ovo je drugi naslov toga tipa u dva dana.
I jučer su Poljaci bili oko nečega nezadovoljni, nisam baš pratio.

Ma znaš da se zezam,... moramo malo razbiti napetost u temi

Bertone kaže:

Ma nema frke, sve pet majstore.
Da, vraćam se na ovo oko EU svađa - izlazi na površinu kako su Poljaci navodno antisemiti, barem prema Macronu.
Super, samo su nam još te svađe falile...

Djuro, ne javljaš se već par dana...
Ako ti se da, vjerujem da si pročitao ove najave svih praktički da ovaj rat neće brzo prestati i da najgori dani tek dolaze.
Možeš li to prokomentirati sa svoje strane gledišta; ti ne mješaš politiku u priču?
Mislio sam da je ruska vojska daleko više pala od, na našim portalima pročitanih - navodnih 15 posto.
Kao, sada su na 85 posto - no nisam shvatio čega?
Zaliha, morala, sveukupno?
Šta je to "najgore" što tek "slijedi"?
Cijenio bih ako ti se da razložit onako kako ti to znaš.
Ako ne, nema veze.

Vidim Rusi su jučer granatirali željezničku stanicu punu civila u ukrajinskom gradu Kramatorsku.
Prema sinoćnjim podacima, četrdesetero mrtvih i na stotine ranjenih.
Među mrtvima je još sinoć nađeno nekliko djece.
Procjenjuje se da će broj mrtvih rasti kako se neki ranjeni neće moći spasiti.
Ti su ljudi čekali na evakuaciju, zato ih je i bilo puno.

Rusi ponovno tvrde - nismo mi.
Onaj njihov glasnogovnornik sa brkovima polusijede kose uvijek u civilu ovaj puta.
Ne Zaharova, ne onaj general: ovaj puta se javio glasnogovnornik Kremlja Dmitry Peskov.
Mislim da ova granatiranja rade Wagnerovci jer ovakvu surovost (barem mislim tako) njihovi ročnici ne bi mogli napraviti.
Ovo je točno sa predumišljajem.
Slika neekspodirane bombe na kojoj piše "Za djecu".

I postigli su upravo to što su napisali...

Ispričavam se na brutalnosti, ali samo da shvatimo svi kako ovo nije teorija, nikakva računalna igrica u kojoj razmišljaš logički pa će se desiti što si predvidio.
Ovdje se događaju strašne stvari i ljudi u najmanju ruku strašno pate i plaču za izgubljenima.

Kloba, copy&paste slika s MSM portala ne vidim baš korisnim, to sve i sami možemo vidjeti na Indexu i drugim mainstream mjestima. Zanimljiv dio bi bilo vidjeti ono što oni ne prenose ili što prenosi druga strana, kao svoju ratnu istinu, pa da onda usporedimo jedno i drugo i dođemo do zaključka.

Točno, novinari su davno izgubili vjerodostojnost. Lažu kad zinu. Vidjeli smo to zadnje dvije godine, a vidimo i sada.
Sve što se objavljuje pod velikim je upitnikom i možemo sumnjati u istinitost.

Kako je sad N1 MSM? Koja je onda uopće definicija MSM i što onda NIJE MSM?

smayoo kaže:


Jako dobro pitanje! U ovom slučaju rekao bih da je MSM svaki medij koji uz vijesti u ratu paralelno ne iznosi informacije s obje strane o nekom događaju, a ne jednostrano. Ne možeš dati vijest o pokolju u 15 minuta, a onda u jednoj rečenici reći "druga strana to poriče". Daj onda i drugoj strani njeno vrijeme i pokaži kako oni komentiraju što se dogodilo, pokaži njihove dokaze i argumentaciju zašto je istina možda drugačija.

Pogotovo nakon što su sami Amerikanci priznali da lažu(!) u medijima, ali da je to "ok" jer je to s dobrom namjerom da "zavaraju Putina". Kako onda više ičemu vjerovati što dolazi samo s jedne strane?

U praksi, to su sada opozicijski zapadni mediji koji podržavaju neku drugu politiku i niz raznih malih nezavisnih medija i novinara koji još uvijek drže do novinarske etike.

Ovo je N1 Srbija. Iako je konkretna vijest prenesena iz zagrebačkog dopisništva.
Znam da su oni CNN grupacija, ali mislim da se o ovakvim stvarima ipak ne laže.
Nisu to samo oni prenjeli.
A vi sumnjajte da je uopće i rat.
Ma tamo sada "cveta cveće u njihovo preduzeće".
Ko bi izmislio rokanje takvog razmjera s tolikim žrtvama?
Pa Zelenski se povodom toga obratio Parlamentu Kraljevine Finske.
Baš povodom ovoga granatiranja.
Jer onda i on laže?
Finci, pa još članovi parlamenta - budale?
Daj Davore - stvarno mislim da nekada izgubiš kompas u traženju istine.
Ne sumnjam da su ti namjere "čiste", ali mislim da si u COVID threadu negdje, tokom 160 stranica - oprosti molim te što ću se tako izraziti - izgubio doticaj sa stvarnošću odnosno bolje rečeno - od šume više ne vidiš ni stablo.
Žao mi je što je tako.
Ali moje je mišljenje da ti se to desilo.
Što se "laganja kada zinu tiče" kao opisa novinara - a tko su danas kredibilni izvori onda?
YouTuberi?
Njhovi gosti, pseudo znanci svega i svačega?
Pa tako možemo do TikTokera?
Istina u 10 sekundi i manje.
Pa nemojte me molim vas.
Ima novinara itekako časnih, samo ih treba znati naći.
Šta fali jednom Bellingcatu, primjerice?
Ima stranica koje se trude.
A za ovakve vijesti - zovite me naivnom budalom - ja vjerujem i CNN-u.
A po meni u MSM spadaju i YouTube, i Twitter, i sve te socijane mreže.
Pogledaj si dokumentarac The social Dilemma, pa će ti ljudi koji su radili na Facebooku, u Twitteru, Googleu, svim današnjim poznatim i manje poznatim socijalnim stranicama - reći kako se tamo odnose prema objektivnom izvještavanju.
U pokušaju bježanja od masmedije ti si ušao u ralje moderne masmedije, a da to ni ne kužiš.

Pa kako nisu uzeli obje strane kada su prenjeli šta Rusi kažu?
Jer vidiš kako pišeš da ne kažem što?
Oćeš da ti pasteam Juliu Ioffe, svih sat vremena razgovora ovdje sa pitanjima pa si čitaj ako ti je lakše?
Sada to napravim da konačno vidiš kako izgleda POUZDAN izvor informacija.
Ili si pogledaj ili pročitaj (kako god hoćeš) konačno nju, ili pogledaj Senada na ovom klipu kako razgovara sa veleposlanikom Rusije u BiH i kako se taj tip tek bahato izražava.
Znači, Rus je dobio skoro sat vremena bez cenzure - navali!

Što se N1 i ove vijesti tiče, glasnogovrnik Kremlja je dobio isti prostor sa svojom izjavom kao i vijest o tragediji.
Možda dvije minute manji.
Išao je u sklopu iste, kao druga strana koju uporno niječeš.
Znaš šta je rekao?
"Mi nismo imali zakazane aktivnosti na tom području za taj dan." - kraj citata.

Davore - da zaključim - kada ti dam zanimljiv dio - ti odgovoriš da "nemaš vremena" i da ti "složim reportažu".
Toliko razumiješ novinarstvo da tražiš da ti intervju prebacim u reportažu.
E prijatelju, tražiš nemoguće.
Jer u intervjuu je bitno sve što je rekla, a to je onda šta?
Prepisivanje a ne reportaža...
Ne odlučujem ja šta je bitno već čitatelj odnosno gledatelj.
Prema tome - ne preostaje mi ništa drugo nego malo slika ubaciti u priču i pastetati ti ovdje đubre na koje ćeš potrošiti pola vremena koje bi potrošio na gledanje.
No vidim da i za fotografije vjeruješ da su namještene.
Prepoznaješ li do koje mjere si počeo sumnjati u sve?
Sutra ćemo se prepirati kakvo je nebo boje - zapravo...

Smayoo, kada Davor reagira ti ovo čudovište obriši molim te, samo da mu dokažem šta čovjek od mene traži:

Putin's Road to War: Julia Ioffe (interview) | FRONTLINE

0:00
We were looking for a place to start the film and to keep the focus on Putin, and it seemed to us that one of the more insightful moments
0:08
about who Putin is in this war is that national Security Council meeting that he has about the breakaway provinces.
0:18
Can you describe it— We're going to have the footage of him walking in by himself, being at the end of the room, his advisers arrayed on the other side.
0:26
Can you describe that moment, what we're seeing? Yeah.
0:32
That Security Council meeting was so wild, and the whole time I was watching it, I kept thinking,
0:39
this is what a Politburo meeting in 1939 must have looked like, when everybody sitting in a Cabinet minister's chair
0:49
was the third replacement since 1937, and each person sitting in that chair knew what had happened to
0:56
his predecessors and how many bullets they got in the back of the head in the basement of Lubyanka [KGB headquarters].
1:03
And I just figured this is how it must have gone down. This is how it must have felt. This is how these people must have spoken.
1:09
This is that fear, that discomfort that they were clearly … dancing bears…
1:16
performing for their master who is impossible to please.
1:22
What else struck me about it was the distance between him and the people sitting in that room was so vast.
1:32
I mean, from every angle you could see it. Another thing that stuck out to me was Sergei Naryshkin, the spy chief, getting up there,
1:41
stumbling through his words, getting a dressing-down by Vladimir Putin, who says, "No, no, speak clearly.
1:49
No, speak clearly. No, that's not it. Say it again." You know, he dressed him down like a schoolboy.
1:56
And this is one of the main siloviki. He is the head of the SVR, the foreign spy service.
2:04
And what's fascinating is that that Security Council meeting was pre-taped.
2:10
It was shown on Russian state TV as a live broadcast. They told their viewers it was live, but then Russian journalists noticed that everybody's watches showed a different time.
2:21
So they taped that, and they decided to show Naryshkin getting humiliated like that, like a schoolmaster taking him to task.
2:32
So the fact that they chose to show that was really interesting, and it made a lot of observers wonder if this was in retaliation or because Putin suspected that the leaks were coming from Naryshkin's people.
2:46
Because everybody was wondering, how did the Americans have such good intelligence? They knew each step of what Putin was going to do.
2:52
I mean, once the war started moving, it was—it all went as the White House had predicted it would,
2:59
and some people saw that scolding of Naryshkin as a kind of retaliation or a show of suspicion that, you know,
3:10
he wasn't being careful enough in protecting the information. There are a couple other things I want to say about that meeting because it was fascinating.
3:19
So while everybody noticed Naryshkin, the person who really stuck out to me was [Viktor] Zolotov,
3:26
the head of Rosgvardiya, the national guard. This unit was formed shortly after the pro-democracy protests of 2011-2012 and after the anti-war protest of 2014
3:40
when Russia first invaded Ukraine. Putin started creating more and more security agencies
3:47
and giving them more and more powers to stifle street protests and stifle dissent.
3:53
There was even a law that was passed that allowed them to shoot live ammunition into crowds of unarmed protesters. …
4:00
So to head up this new security agency called the Rosgvardiya, or the Russian Guard, he picked Viktor Zolotov, who was his old bodyguard.
4:09
And this is, you know—this is a, I want to say, a mace in human form or a club in human form,
4:20
just completely loyal muscle and fists. And what you saw in that meeting was he gets up there in his uniform with his striped,
4:31
standard issue military undershirt... ranting about the Americans and how the Ukrainians are just American puppets. …
4:38
And of course at the same time, his grandson lives in London, you know.
4:45
That was the thing about pretty much everybody in that meeting. They were up there — they went up there and dutifully said what the master wanted them to say,
4:53
both about the breakaway republics and about the West, while all of them have relatives and property in the West.
5:02
The other person who really stuck out to me was Valentina Matviyenko, who is the speaker of the Federation Council, which is the upper chamber of the Russian parliament.
5:15
And I don't think I've ever seen anybody look more uncomfortable on camera.
5:21
It reminded a little bit of the appearances we used to get in the first decade of Putin's rule of Lyudmila Putina,
5:28
who was then his wife, who would periodically get trotted out, who never looked happy to be there…. And just Matviyenko sitting there, you could just—she looked nauseous.
5:37
She looked queasy and uneasy and almost as if she was trying to avoid having to speak.
5:49
… And the last thing I'll say about the Security Council meeting is, we now know, a week into the war,
5:57
more and more information is coming out of Moscow about how shocked everybody is in the Kremlin,
6:05
in the Defense Ministry, in the Foreign Ministry. Nobody, not even people pretty close to Putin, thought he would do this.
6:13
They thought he would recognize the breakaway republics, maybe move some troops in, and that would be the extent of it.
6:19
Nobody expected this. People in the Kremlin and in the prime minister's office are telling journalists anonymously that they're absolutely stunned,
6:28
and they don't—they kind of don't know what to do, and they didn't expect this, and they're just, like, shellshocked.
6:35
People in the Ministry of Defense, including pretty high-ranking members of the Ministry of Defense, are just completely stunned and seem kind of—seem to have been completely caught off guard
6:50
by Putin's orders to launch a full-scale invasion. … I read those news stories about anonymous sources in the Kremlin and in the prime minster's office
6:59
and in the Foreign Ministry being against this and being shellshocked, and I think, well, why don't they all resign?
7:05
You know, you can't arrest them all. Why don't they resign? Why don't they not follow these orders if they think that they're deranged, which they clearly do? …
7:13
I think back to that Security Council meeting, and I realize how scared they must all be of him, how they're all
7:19
locked into this closed solar system with him as the center, and they're all afraid of getting arrested or falling from grace.
7:28
They don't—they have no life outside of this. They can't exist outside of the government.
7:34
If you're not in, if you get that high up and that close to Putin, if you fall, you don't fall back to civilian life; you go to jail.
7:43
You lose everything. And they have been living—they also have clearly been living in this atmosphere of fear
7:51
that they are also helping foment in the nation and spread in the country, but they themselves are clearly scared. …
7:58
But you see how this all went down, or you're starting to see in retrospect how this all happened
8:05
and how much of it was driven just by one man, his deranged ideas,
8:10
and how everybody around him thought it was a terrible idea but was too scared to say anything about it or to resist.
8:17
And it just makes me feel like, oh, I'm getting a sneak peek into how it worked in the 1930s.
8:25
… Is there any question about who is making the decisions in that room? Who is making the decisions about leading the country into war?
8:34
Oh, no, it was very clear. And as we now know, it's very clearly just Putin's war.
8:40
The Russian army is fighting it, and you can tell they're doing it halfheartedly, reluctantly, poorly.
8:48
But it's his war that they're waging. I think the Security Council meeting, you know, it's like a Russian election.
8:57
Did people vote for Putin? Yes, technically they did. Did most of the people who voted technically vote for Putin?
9:05
Yes, they did. Did he technically win every election he's run in? He absolutely did.
9:10
Is he a democratically elected president of Russia? No, he's not, right, because the elections weren't free and fair,
9:17
because the political system is absolutely rigged and monopolized by the Kremlin. And so it is with the Security Council meeting.
9:25
Did he ask everybody's opinion? Yes, he did. Did everybody volunteer themselves, technically, the idea that Putin should recognize these breakaway republics?
9:38
They did. Was it done voluntarily? Do they really believe that that should have been done?
9:46
Probably not. We don't know. But it's this very Soviet obsession with bureaucracy and ticking the boxes
9:54
and insisting on the form while completely abandoning or perverting the substance, if that makes sense.
10:05
It does, and it's very helpful. … We're probably going to follow that with the moment of what he calls the “special operation” that is the war.
10:16
And we're about to go and explore his life and what led him to that moment. So when you see him lead Russia into this war, does it feel to you like a culmination of a lifetime from the KGB,
10:29
from rising up; that this is a seminal moment for him or something he's been building towards?
10:35
I think it's too pat to say that it's something he's building— he's been building toward his whole life from his days in the KGB, etc.
10:43
I think that's too pat a narrative. I think he's clearly been building up to this for the last decade, and definitely for the last few years.
10:53
That speech was really interesting because it was not about NATO.
10:58
It wasn't even really about Ukraine. It was mostly about the U.S.
11:04
It was about this eschatological battle between Russia and the U.S., between Washington and Moscow.
11:13
Whether it is Soviet Moscow and Cold War-era Washington or their present-day versions, it almost didn't matter.
11:21
And it felt like he had this unfinished Cold War business with the U.S., like he wanted to finish the fight that had, you know, ended in a draw, almost, in 1991.
11:35
So in that sense, I think it is a culmination of that kind of paranoiac Cold War thinking that he absorbed in the KGB.
11:47
What I think is really important to convey to people who have never met somebody who used to work in the KGB
11:53
or in the FSB [Federal Security Service] is that these people are incredibly paranoid. They're incredibly conspiralogically minded [sic]. …
12:02
It's this KGB way of thinking that every door is a trap door; every wall has some kind of secret hiding place behind it.
12:14
I don't know how to explain it—that everything is a false bottom; that everybody has a puppeteer;
12:20
that just like in the Cold War, every war was a proxy between the Soviet Union and the U.S., so it is here.
12:30
And so if Russia has designs on Ukraine and the West is against it, that must be because Ukraine is a puppet of the U.S.
12:39
What was also interesting about that speech was, you know, the first—it was about half an hour.
12:45
The first 15 minutes were about the U.S. … So we in the West have come to think of the Cold War as a bad thing.
12:52
We celebrated its end. We unanimously think that the end of the Cold War is an unalloyed good.
13:01
Putin does not agree, and he first laid this out for the world in 2007 at the Munich Security Conference when he said the Cold War was good.
13:12
… He said it was a bipolar world; one pole, center of power, was in Washington, and the other was in Moscow,
13:20
and they balanced each other, and they provided checks on each other. And he said—and this is a quote—he said it provided for global security, which of course ignores the fact that
13:30
there were bloody proxy wars everywhere: Angola, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Ethiopia, Vietnam and El Salvador.
13:39
But in his mind, it was a good time. Russia was on top of the world.
13:45
Russia was one of the two big guys calling the shots. Moscow's opinion always had to be taken into account.
13:53
Moscow had to be asked for permission. Moscow could mess up Washington's plans anywhere in the world, and he would like to get back to that.
14:03
And the same way that in 2007 he laid at the U.S.'s doorstep all the faults and all the problems that had come out of
14:12
this new "unipolar" world order, as he called it, with only the U.S. calling the shots—and I mean, this was 2007.
14:20
That was the height of the insurgency in Iraq.
14:25
Afghanistan was starting to go sideways. … Bush's program of democracy promotion all over the world was bringing revolution to countries in Russia's orbit,
14:37
former Soviet republics, and he said, you know, this unipolar world order, what has it gotten us?
14:43
It has gotten us blood and chaos in Iraq, in Afghanistan. And he reprised that theme again when he announced that he was invading Ukraine.
14:54
He said again this is not OK. America can't call all the shots.
14:59
The Cold War was good. Now that there's no balance, no counterweight to the U.S., we got Iraq; …
15:06
we got Syria; we got Egypt; we got Libya; we got Afghanistan.
15:12
And I'm watching this, and I'm thinking, OK, fair enough, but what does that have to do with Ukraine?
15:19
Ukraine didn't do any of these things. … And then when he does get to talking about Ukraine, he talks about it first as a puppet of the U.S.,
15:32
so still framing it in the context of the U.S., and then he reprises another thing that he said many times,
15:41
which is that Ukraine is not a real country; Ukrainians are basically Russian; Ukrainians and Russians are one people. …
15:50
He said in 2008 to George W. Bush at Bucharest when George W. Bush and Condoleezza Rice
15:58
pushed NATO to open their doors to Georgia and Ukraine, Putin said to George Bush then, he said,
16:05
"George, you know Ukraine is not a real country." So what we're seeing now is not a new Putin.
16:13
We're seeing a Putin that is kind of distilled, concentrated.
16:20
There's also been a lot of talk that this is the product of isolation.
16:26
… The thing that's so interesting about it is that Putin frames it in terms of strategic balance and NATO and the threat to Russia.
16:34
So we think about wars and international relations in terms of a balance of power. And I think the question for you and the question we have in the film is, how much of this is that strategic balance
16:44
between Russia and NATO, and how much of this is the fears and the anxieties
16:50
and thinking of one man that have built up over a lifetime? I think it's a combination of things.
16:58
I think, first, he turns 70 in October.
17:04
He loves round dates. Is that—no, that's—I'm sorry, that's a Russianism.
17:09
What is that? How do you say that? Like, Kruglaya data, means a round date.
17:17
Significant numbers? Yeah, like big anniversaries.
17:23
The first thing that's important to notice, he turns 70 in October. He puts a lot of stock in numbers and big, important dates and anniversaries.
17:34
It's also an age to which most Russian men never live. He has outlived the vast majority of his cohort.
17:42
He is clearly thinking about his legacy, and has been for sometime.
17:50
I think Ukraine was always a missing piece in the legacy.
17:58
Far smarter people than I have written about this, but from the Kremlin's point of view,
18:03
or from Putin's point of view, in the fall of 2021, he has vanquished the opposition.
18:13
I mean, there's nobody left; people are either dead, in jail or in exile.
18:19
Civil society has been eviscerated. There's barely any independent media left.
18:25
The economy is doing pretty well; it has survived the sanctions of the last few years.
18:31
He has squirreled away these massive reserves, $600-something billion.
18:36
He has slowly built up Russia's position in the world, often by playing spoiler and often
18:42
by taking the U.S. down a few pegs. He has kind of equalized, or more, has rebalanced the power dynamic between Russia and the U.S.
18:55
He's built a good relationship with China. He has filled the vacuum left in the Middle East by the U.S. withdrawal.
19:03
He has moved into parts of Africa and Latin America. He has, in his mind, reestablished Russia as a superpower on the world stage.
19:15
And all that's missing is Ukraine, which, recall, he does not believe is a real country,
19:22
which he believes historically is part of Russia and which needs to be brought back into the fold. …
19:31
We're going to go back. We'll have launched the war, and we'll go back into his life as a KGB agent, his rise, his fear as he's watching the
19:40
color revolutions, watching Arab Spring, watching Ukraine, and then having sent troops and captured Crimea.
19:50
And we'll pick up sometime around then, around 2015, as he's contemplating what he's going to do in the American election in 2016.
19:58
Who is Putin at that moment, as he's about to make this decision that he's going to interfere in the election?
20:06
He's about to do a bunch of other things that you've talked about, become more and more aggressive. Who is he? Because we'll have watched him rise up to that point and get more and more fearful that the U.S. is trying to overthrow him.
20:18
Where does he see himself at that moment, after Crimea has happened?
20:23
… I think in 2015, Putin is riding high. He managed to dupe the West and outfox them by quickly invading Crimea
20:36
and annexing it before anybody can really fully realize what's going on or stop him.
20:42
He starts this astroturf separatist war in the East, all done under the cover of plausible deniability.
20:50
In the Donbas, they’re volunteers. In Crimea, they’re "little green men" who just went to the army surplus store and got Russian military fatigues.
21:00
And the U.S. couldn't stop him. And they're, you know, wringing their hands and wondering if they should send lethal aid, etc.
21:11
In the meantime, he's getting everything he wanted. He got a huge bump domestically by annexing Crimea,
21:19
by bringing back a part of what is seen erroneously by Russians as part of the Russian heartland, historic heartland.
21:27
I mean, his approval ratings go through the roof. The U.S. and the EU and several other countries have imposed sanctions on him, but he has ridden them out fully.
21:40
He's fine. The economy's fine; it has managed to recover, and start thriving even.
21:46
What else is happening? He has managed to splinter Europe.
21:53
He has managed to take advantage of the Obama administration's waffling on the Middle East to get involved in Syria,
22:04
and therefore make it even more impossible for the U.S. to do anything. So he has kind of drawn a line in the sand so that the U.S. can't topple Bashar al-Assad.
22:15
He has become very close with the Israeli government, with Bibi Netanyahu, you know,
22:22
muscling in on what is traditionally American geopolitical turf, right? There is—the truism in Washington is that America has no closer ally in the Middle East than Europe.
22:34
Well, suddenly the Israeli prime minister is going to Moscow more often than he's going to Washington.
22:42
He's selling arms to American allies, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, who are some of the biggest buyers of American arms and are seen as allies of the U.S. …
22:53
He's very confident in himself. Very confident, yeah. … He does take this risk in the election.
23:01
And whether or not he had any influence on the outcome of the election, he gets credit for it from a lot of people.
23:08
Trump ends up winning. There's some sanctions and some diplomats kicked out, but what does he take from the end of that?
23:14
Is he even more emboldened at the end of 2016? Well, first of all, I don't think he expected Trump to win, so that was a huge bonus because at the time,
23:26
everybody in the Kremlin and in Russia thought—well, at the time, everybody in the Kremlin
23:33
and everybody who was Kremlin-adjacent thought that Trump was their greatest ally and that he would be there,
23:40
as one former Kremlin adviser told me, that he would be "our wrecking ball inside America."
23:47
They didn't expect to get that lucky. … I don't think they expected Americans to get so worked up.
23:52
And on one hand, they didn't like it because it caused—it brought about all these sanctions and a vilification of Russia.
23:58
On the other hand, now Americans thought they were 12 feet tall and perfect villains.
24:05
And I think the fact that we still don't know, and we'll never be able to know whether Putin and the Russians
24:11
influenced the outcome of the elections is, it's kind of part of the brilliance of the operation, right?
24:18
They've gotten in our heads. And Trump—sorry.
24:23
I was going to say, and then he ultimately—he ultimately gets away with it. Trump is grateful because Trump has been briefed that Putin tried to help him win.
24:33
Trump is grateful. He likes Putin because he wants to be like Putin; it's the kind of guy he can understand and relate to
24:42
because that's the kind of leader he wants to be. And even though every once in a while Trump's own administration and Congress are
24:50
rolling out sanctions against Russia, he's also constantly kneecapping NATO.
24:55
He is undermining the EU at every turn. He is exacerbating divisions inside the European Union, which is just, you know, music to Putin's ears.
25:08
He's doing—he's doing Putin's work for him. So even with the sanctions, which were, I think, of minimal impact to the Russian economy, he—
25:22
I think he saw that as a win. I think he clocked that as a win. And that means it was a signal to keep going, to take more risks.
25:30
One thing we may use is that meeting that they have in Helsinki. Oh, God.
25:35
The two of them. What must Putin be thinking? And what lessons is he taking from Trump as he's meeting him,
25:45
as he's watching him just embodying Trump's presidency sort of in that moment? What is Putin taking away from that that's going to shape the way he sees things going forward?
25:57
… I think at that meeting, when Trump says in front of the world, in front of the American press,
26:04
in front of everybody that he trusts Putin more than he trusts the American intelligence community
26:09
and the American political system, I mean, you could roll the credits there.
26:17
That is such a win for Putin. It is such a—you know, it's like watching your enemy shoot himself in both feet, both hands.
26:28
It's your enemy admitting that you are better, that you are stronger, that you—I mean, it's everything he's ever wanted.
26:34
It's for the U.S. to admit that the U.S. is stupid and weak and bad and that Russia is good and strong and powerful.
26:42
He should have—he should have stopped there.
26:48
That was—that was a big win. … Trump is out. He watched Trump lose, and Biden comes in.
26:55
Sorry. I think one crucial thing there is—what's it called? [Former intelligence office Sergei] Skripal, the poisonings.
27:09
Yes, because he's also becoming more active overseas.
27:15
Was that fall of 2018? Was that after Helsinki? I can't remember.
27:21
March of 2018.
27:26
Oh, so before Helsinki. But I think that's part of the risk-taking, right? He's gotten away with everything so far, so why not push it a little step further?
27:38
He has this guy; he's been a thorn in his side for a long time. He's a traitor, and Putin has said publicly that traitors belong dead in the—or traitors will always end up dead in the ditch.
27:50
And he does something unthinkable. He has people enter U.K. territory with military-grade nerve agent.
28:00
Of course, they mess it up, and they don't— you know, they don't end up killing the guy, but they kill a random British woman.
28:07
And what could the West do? They expelled some diplomats, so Russia expelled some diplomats, too. And whenever that happens, because a lot of Russia's diplomats aren't official, Russia wins.
28:17
Even though it's like tit for tat and diplomat for diplomat when they expel them, somehow Russia always ends up having more diplomats when it's done, right?
28:26
So like, even after consequences were imposed, they still won that round because that sent such a strong message
28:36
to any potential defector, to any potential critic, that you are not safe anywhere; you're not even safe in the West.
28:45
I think you're right that that's such an important moment. Trump comes out — or Trump is voted out of office,
28:51
and Biden comes in, somebody who's not as much of a supporter as Trump was.
28:56
But he's watching America; he's watching Jan. 6; he's watching Afghanistan. What does Putin see in America that might lead him to think that this is a moment when he could take Ukraine?
29:07
I think he correctly sees America as a nation so divided that it's paralyzed;
29:14
that it is a nation at each other's throats that can't agree on anything. And whatever one team says, the other team will say just the opposite, just because.
29:24
He sees a president who, on one hand, he's dealt with before.
29:30
Biden was put in charge of the Ukraine portfolio in 2014 because Obama had not enough time to deal with it,
29:41
and frankly, I don't think cared that much about Ukraine. So on one hand, he has—he's dealing with a new president who is old, who has been around,
29:52
who has Putin's number, who is surrounded by aides and advisers and people in the State Department
30:00
and in the White House and then the Pentagon who know Putin well, who know his tricks, who see right through him.
30:06
But on the other hand, he barely has control of Congress. He doesn't have the Supreme Court.
30:12
He doesn't have the American public. And then Afghanistan happens, and the message that sends to Putin
30:21
and I think to the rest of the world is that America's done with its adventures abroad.
30:27
America's tired of it. America's turning even more inward. America has no more appetite for war.
30:33
It has expended all the energy it possibly had for war. It's spent.
30:39
And if Putin were to do something now, America wouldn't retaliate, because why end a war— a long foreign war?
30:49
Why take such a political hit, because this is done so messily, just to get your troops bogged down in another thing?
30:55
And I think that was a very accurate read of the situation.
31:01
The thing you said you were going to talk about before and I said we'd get to it later is these images of Putin during the time of COVID,
31:08
of video conferences, being at the end of a long table, really looking like somebody in their own world, physically isolated.
31:18
What do you make of those images that we've seen of Putin over the last two years?
31:24
And how has that played into this? So in 2018, I went on a reporting trip to Moscow and—actually in 2018, I went on a book research trip to Moscow,
31:37
and I met up with one of my old friends who's a reporter in the Kremlin press pool.
31:42
He's had that position forever. He's really good. He really understands the workings of the Kremlin.
31:48
And we had dinner, and I asked him, you know, the economy was not doing so well.
31:55
There was a lot of public discontent around the presidential elections, around the fact that a lot of people had been arrested all over the country, that Alexei Navalny was disqualified from running.
32:06
And he said, "You know, everybody in the Kremlin thinks everything is going great. They are not getting good information.
32:12
… And whatever information they have, it's not getting to the top, and they have no idea what's happening.
32:19
They think everybody's happy." And that was 2018. Then COVID comes along, and Putin's paranoia kicks in.
32:29
His instinct for self-preservation kicks in, and even though he tells the country after a brief lockdown,
32:38
he says, "Look, we can't shut down our economy. We're not a rich Western country," he said, "We don't have a rich grand—we don't have a rich auntie like America does.
32:47
We have to stay at work, go to work." Meanwhile, he retreats into total isolation.
32:54
For a while there was—there was this weird contraption that people had to walk through
33:00
and get sprayed with this weird mist that was supposed to decontaminate them or something before meeting with Putin.
33:09
Then he started isolating. And anybody who had to see—who wanted to see him had to isolate,
33:16
quarantine for two weeks specially in a hotel set aside for that purpose.
33:22
Staff, bodyguards, advisers. The president of Kazakhstan had to sit in a hotel room for two weeks and get meals brought to his door
33:29
so that he could see Putin. People like Andrey Kostin, who's the head of VTB Bank, which is known as the wallet of the FSB,
33:39
which was just sanctioned, had to quarantine for two weeks. People who were trusted, close people had to quarantine.
33:47
And you can imagine what kind of isolation that breeds. Meanwhile, you know, Russia ends up having one of the highest, if not the highest, per capita COVID death rate.
34:01
So Russians had to go to work and die of COVID to keep up the Russian economy.
34:08
I mean, nothing changed. People partied; people went to restaurants, movies, everything, rode the Metro.
34:15
But Putin stayed in isolation. And there's reports trickling out, again, from the presidential administration, from the Defense Ministry
34:26
that a lot of his advisers think this is partly the product of isolation, that he went a little batty
34:35
in two years of basically self-imposed solitary confinement, which as we know does very strange things to the mind.
34:45
I do think it's funny to think, though, that, you know, we all got cabin fever at some point during these COVID lockdowns,
34:54
and most people, like, baked bread or bought too much stuff on Amazon, and he's like, "I'll invade Ukraine."
35:00
It's just—it's wild. It's also a physical manifestation of something that has been ratcheting up over his presidency, which is taking out critics,
35:11
people who might threaten him, people who disagree with him, anybody who's outside of his own view of the world.
35:19
So I think this really started with 2014. Before 2014—well, it started with 2012, 2014.
35:28
Before the protests, before the annexation of Crimea, Putin had a pretty diverse circle of advisers.
35:34
They included the hawks, his old KGB friends and KGB alums, the kind of siloviki, the strongmen.
35:44
And then there were the so-called liberals, the people who had fancy economic degrees,
35:49
who had worked in the banking sector, who spent all their time courting Western investors to come and invest in Russia
35:56
and who were trying to open Russia more and more to the West and to integrate it into the global economy.
36:03
And there was always a tension between those two camps, between the liberals and the siloviki.
36:08
And the seesaw went back and forth, back and forth. And then, after the protests of 2012, when Putin felt that the white-collar, urban, upper middle class
36:19
betrayed him when he had been so good to them in making them wealthy, and in 2014,
36:25
when a lot of those same liberals found the annexation of Crimea to be anathema and came out and protested against him,
36:35
he basically cut out the liberals then because they were advising him not to do this, not to go further in Ukraine
36:42
because there could be more and more sanctions that would be damaging to the Russian economy, that it's not worth it
36:48
for a peninsula or not worth it for this little bit of land in eastern Ukraine, and he responded by just shutting them out.
36:54
And so then, after 2014, it was just the circle of the siloviki, and then even that circle got smaller and smaller and smaller over time.
37:03
And now as far as we know, it's a circle of like two or three people, who, by the looks of things, are even crazier than Putin.
37:11
Putin is like the moderating voice in that crew. As he's thinking of invading Ukraine,
37:16
does he understand the state of the Russian military, the views of the Ukrainian people, the approach of the West?
37:22
Does he understand what is going on? No. … I don't think Putin understands. I think he made a colossal miscalculation, and we're seeing it on the ground every single day.
37:32
He thought Ukrainians were Russians, that they agree with him that Ukraine is basically just an outpost of Russia and can be easily folded back into Russia.
37:43
Clearly Ukrainians don't agree. He thought Russian troops would be greeted as liberators, with flowers on the streets of Ukraine.
37:51
Instead they're greeting them with Molotov cocktails. They're trying to stop the tanks with their bare hands.
37:57
They're greeting them with javelins, with signs that say "Russians, f--- off."
38:03
They're fighting to the death because they don't want to be part of Russia, because they disagree.
38:10
And I don't think he understood or anticipated that that would happen,
38:16
even though everybody could see that that was what would happen, because everything that Putin has said he wanted to do in Ukraine, he has achieved the opposite of, starting in 2014.
38:29
Before 2013, Ukraine really was a nation divided. There was the Russian-speaking east where a lot of the people who lived there
38:38
were the descendants of ethnic Russians who were brought in by the Soviets to work in the mines and the factories.
38:43
They had no Ukrainian identity; they didn't speak Ukrainian; they didn't feel any kinship with the Ukrainian west,
38:51
which had a slightly different version of Christianity, which spoke Ukrainian and was culturally different.
38:58
And there was this constant seesaw. One presidential election, Ukraine would elect somebody from the Russian-speaking east
39:06
that would be more friendly to the Kremlin, and then people wouldn't like that, and then they would sweep them out of power and elect a kind of pro-Western western Ukrainian person.
39:16
And it went back and forth, back and forth. NATO membership was not very popular. Ukraine wasn't really sure what it was as a nation.
39:24
Was it part of the old Russian-speaking former Soviet universe? Was it part of the West?
39:29
Was it a European country or a former Soviet country? And then Putin invades in 2014, lops off a very strategic part of Ukraine,
39:41
a beloved part of Ukraine where Ukrainians love to vacation. He starts a bloody conflict in the east, which by the time of this current invasion
39:52
had taken more than 13,000 lives and destroyed a lot of homes and infrastructure.
39:59
And all of this has had the effect of rallying Ukrainians, both in the east and the west,
40:08
around the Ukrainian flag, around the Ukrainian language, against Russia. So even people in the east who used to be pro-Russian hate Russia now.
40:19
Even before this invasion, they hated Russia; they didn't want to be a part of Russian anymore.
40:25
You have Ukrainian politicians saying, the person who has formed our Ukrainian identity the most is Vladimir Putin.
40:32
He gave us a national identity. And now everybody wants to—again, before the invasion even, everybody wanted to join NATO.
40:41
Then he invades, and Finland wants to join NATO—Finland, which had been neutral forever.
40:48
Sweden wants to join NATO. The EU, which was waffling forever and dragging its feet on accepting Ukraine,
40:55
which was one of the reasons—there was an EU-Ukrainian economic cooperation agreement
41:00
[EU-Ukraine Association Agreement], one of the things that set off the Maidan Revolution in 2013-2014.
41:05
Now it looks like Ukraine's going to get into he EU with a fast-track membership.
41:11
He wanted a stable economy. He's destroyed that. I mean, he's just—he's miscalculated on so many fronts,
41:18
and I think in part it's because he's so isolated, and, you know, getting high on his own supply.
41:25
What are the consequences, the human side, that Putin can make this decision that is going to affect both of these countries in such a profound way?
41:34
I don't know. I think I'm too close to it. I personally find it nauseating. I'm seeing in real time lives upended by it, and not just the way people are seeing it on their screens, of apartment buildings
41:47
being bombed and a million refugees fleeing Ukraine in just a week, and that's a million stories, a million heartbreaks.
41:57
It's not just these conscripts who have no idea what they're doing or why they're there.
42:02
It's not just the economic fallout in Russia, which we're just seeing the beginning of.
42:09
It's—you know, I have friends on both sides of the border, and you—there's nothing like watching people close to you as their future evaporates in front of them.
42:26
Just all their plans, all their hopes, all their dreams, not just for the next five years, for the next week, for the next month,
42:35
just gone in a day, up in smoke, and a total inability to help them, to console them;
42:47
watching my Russian friends flee Russia just with anything they—whatever they have on their backs.
42:57
I have a friend who I hope she got across the border, but was gunning her car to the border, trying to get to Latvia before Putin declared martial law.
43:10
It's—it's infuriating. It's infuriating.
43:16
Like, for what? For one man's mistaken reading of history? For his own ego?
43:23
For his own warped understanding of legacy? … I know it’s a hard situation for you, so thank you for talking about it.
43:30
And my last question is, how dangerous is this moment right now, and how dangerous is Putin in this moment right now?
43:37
There's obviously all these not-veiled threats about nuclear weapons, and there's talk of other countries being dragged in by mistake or on purpose.
43:45
How dangerous is Putin? I think he's more dangerous than he's ever been at any point in the last 22 years.
43:53
I think he did not expect to lose in Ukraine, and therefore he will not lose.
44:00
He will grind the country down to a fine, fine ash. And it doesn't matter how many Russian soldiers die in the process,
44:11
how many Ukrainian soldiers and civilians die in the process, he will not be humiliated by people he calls "little Russians." What that means for Europe, you know, if you just—even if you set that tragedy aside or that blooming tragedy aside,
44:26
again, a million people in a week fled … to some of the most xenophobic countries in Europe, who right now are
44:32
greeting them with open arms because a, they're their neighbors; and b, they're white and Christian and look like them.
44:38
But how long does that last? How many more refugees can the West absorb?
44:45
We saw with the refugee flows from Syria, they gave us Brexit;
44:52
they gave us the rise and the empowerment of the far right in Germany and Hungary, in the Czech Republic and France.
45:02
Is this going to keep emboldening the far right? … And when Putin threatens the use of nuclear weapons,
45:10
he threatened it the first time when he declared war on Thursday morning.
45:16
He threatened again three days into the war when he saw it wasn't going well. He threatened it in 2018 when he went to that airshow
45:26
and he gave that crazy presentation about all the new nuclear weapons he had that could strike the U.S.
45:35
If people think that he won't use them, I think they are mistaken.
45:50
Everything Putin has showed us at every step over last 22 years is that every time we think that he won’t go that far, he does.

I ima još što kopiranje titlova nije uhvatilo a ja bi sada trebao tu ubacivati, njen zadnji zaključak i sumacija teme i razgovora.
Prebaci na prikazanu minutu i sekundu, želiš li čuti samo to.
Shvaćaš li me - kako da ti ovo obradim?
Nije li ti lakše pogledati isto?
Sorry, ali ovakve stvari radim za lovu a ne da nekome dokažem da bi možda mogao u nečemu biti u krivu.
Bez ljutnje, oprosti ali ono - napisao si par stvari koje su mi malo, znaš već kako reagirale na tlak.
Sorry na tome.
Uglavnom, dobio si u pisanom obliku ono što si odavno mogao pogledati.
U međuvremenu si pogledao svoje kredibilne izvore i potrošio pet puta više vremena na njihove video uratke.
A ja recimo za te autore držim da nemaju ništa veći kredibilitet od N1.
Kim Iversen?
Ona je super ali N1 je MSM.
Joooj.
Glava me boli.
Ne mogu više.
Oprosti, ali stvarno ne mogu.

Koliko me samo ove scene iz Ukrajine podsjecaju na djetinjstvo. Jako puno stvari je skoro identicno.

Ti kada pod opsadom drzis jedan grad i granatiras ga nasumicno, samo je pitanje vremena kada ce neka od tih granata pasti na mjesto gdje su civili grupirani iz bilo kojeg razloga. Cekaju vodu, hranu, prijevoz, sjede u park, stagod... Ne moras biti ni sposoban ni precizan, niti imati tu direktnu namjeru. Statistika i zakon vjerojatnoce ce odraditi svoje. Ukoliko im das dovoljno vremena :/

U Sarajevu je pala na Markale, poginulo jako puno ljudi. Stotine nastradalih od jedne minobacacke granate koja je pala u masu na pijaci. Mozda su gadjali namjerno (lako moguce), mozda je tu pala slucajno (isto tako moguce, jer popijes litar rakije pa ti je cijeli grad cilj). Svejedno je, posljedice su tragicne. I onda je bilo nismo mi, to oni sami sebe ubijaju da Srbi ispadnu losi, da izazovu reakciju svijeta i sl. Isto to rade i Rusi sada. Zalosno i jadno.

Na samom kraju rata u Tuzli je pala granata u strogi centar grada. Pjesacka zona. Poginulih 71, ranjenih preko 200 valjda. Od jedne jedine granate. Neki top 100mm sa 30ak km udaljenosti je pogodio nemoguce. Putanja granate je izmedju visokih zgrada pravo u masu prolaznika. Poginulo je i dijete od 3 godine. Srbi naravno odmah nismo mi. Sami sebe ubijaju. I onda stranci izracunaju i putanju i mjesto odakle je ispaljena.

Kasnije je na Ozrenu zarobljen i taj top. Pale su i sudske presude. Srbi i dan danas govore nismo mi. A cijeli rat granatirali moj grad sa dvije planine. Pogine jedno nikom nista, ali kad se desi masakr pa to zavrsi na svim vijestima e to nismo mi. Poturaj nam. Govna licemjerna.

hr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Masakr_na_Kapiji

I tada je isto tako bilo "nevisnih stručnjaka" koji su izražavali "ozbiljnu sumnju" i podržavali tezu da su civili "sami na sebe" ispalili granatu.

Kloba kaže:


Pozdrav, ne javljam se baš redovito jer su bila testiranja za WRC ovaj tjedan pa sam po cijele dane na potezu Lobor-Vrbovsko-Bosiljevo
Drugi razlog je taj da se zapravo ni u taktičkom, ni u strateškom smislu u Ukrajini ne događa puno. Rusi su se skroz povukli iz sjevera Ukrajine te je Kijev i sve oko njega do Harkiva zapravo slobodno i bez ruskih snaga. Ljudi se vraćaju doma, obrambene snage čiste teren od mina i to je to.
Od svih ruskih snaga koje su bile namijenjene okupaciji Kijeva oko 30 posto, prema obavještajnim podacima, ostaje gore stacionirano. Neki misle da to znači da će Rusi opet krenuti na Kijev. Meni se to ne čini realnim. To mi prije zvuči kao snage koje su vjerojatno u najgorem stanju pa ostaju gore da se malo odmore i priberu i čisto kao potencijalna prijetnja Kijevu kako bi Ukrajinci morali ostaviti nešto svojih snaga gore za svaki slučaj, umjesto da sve odmah pošalju prema Harkivu i dalje na jug.
Ostanimo još malo u ovom području. Oni vojnici koji su kopali rovove u Crvenoj šumi oko Černobila su gotovi. Nakon što su ukrajinske snage našle rovove i izmjerile zračenje (kažu da su ovi nesretnici u sat vremena primili dozu zračenja kao da su im četiri puta slikana pluća) od 71 μSv/h.



Sve što su imali od opreme je izuzetno ozračeno, a oni su kopali tu zemlju, udisali prašinu, jeli hranu koja je bila također izložena tom zračenju; stručnjaci kažu da nitko od njih neće dočekati godišnjicu invazije Ukrajine. Upravo nevjerojatno i sramotno za rusku vojsku da tako pošalje ljude bez ikakve pripreme, obuke, opreme i osudi ih na polaganu i neizbježnu smrt, a zapravo je to najbolji primjer stanja u ruskoj vojsci.
Idemo dolje, prema jugu. Sad je manje-više jasno da je minimalni cilj Putina spajanje Krima kopneno s odmetnutim regijama. A nakon malo kopanja, našao sam i osnovni razlog za novoprobuđenu ljubav Rusa prema Krimu 2014. Naime, godinu i pol ranije u podmorju Crnog mora južno od Krima su pronađene izuzetno bogate zalihe zemnog plina. Shell je već bio i dobio koncesiju na dodatna istraživanja koja su Ukrajinu trebala učinti ne samo posve energetski neovisnom od Moskve, nego ju čak i učiniti velikim izvoznikom plina i konkurentom toj istoj Moskvi. Sve su kockice sjele na mjesto i sad je sve jasno i bez ikakve sumnje. Kako sam rekao, nikakva NATO ugroza, čisti pljačkaški pohod.
Rusi na ovom području i dalje imaju značajne logističke probleme. Ta područja su od ruske granice udaljena preko 400 km, a vidjeli smo kako su šepali na upola manjim udaljenostima na sjeveru. Istini za volju, treba reći da je konfiguracija terena na jugu pogodnija za njih: nije močvarno područje i nema šuma, nego su to uglavnom stepe i to su sve preduvjeti da Rusi krenu u ozbiljan napad u skladu sa svojom doktrinom, a Crvena je armija oduvijek bila artiljerijska vojska. Dapače, na ovom potezu je i Kursk (iako cca 150 km u ruskom teritoriju). Ukrajina ne smije ući u tenkovski duel s Rusima na otvorenom, jer Rusi imaju puno veće snage. I Ukrajinci to ni ne čine. Rusi ih zasad testiraju pojedinačnim pokušajima proboja na vrlo dugoj liniji fronte, ali Ukrajinci ih uspješno odbijaju. Tu se sad vraćamo na njihovo lako pješaštvo i brz manevar koji je nemjerljivo brži od ruskog, izviđanja dronovima i specijalnim snagama koje operiraju po ruskoj pozadini i izuzetno precizno navode dalekometno ukrajinsko topništvo koje uništavajuće djeluje na ruski oklop. Dosad sam izbjegavao prikaz ruskih gubitaka kako ga Ukrajinci navode, ali nakon one analize od pred neki dan koja je pokazala da ti podaci zapravo i nisu pretjerano/uopće napuhani, evo donosim i taj prikaz ovdje.



Po njemu je Rusiaj dosad izgubila preko 700 tenkova i čak uz pretjerivanje od 10 posto to su strahoviti gubici. Kloba, onih 80-85 posto se odnosi na brojno stanje snaga s kojima su Rusi krenuli u osvajanje Ukrajine. To smo rekli da je bilo oko 190.000 ljudi. Kako je kao predložak poslužila Operacija Dunav iz 1968. gušenja Praškog proljeća, usporedimo te snage. Tad je na Čehoslovačku (tad 15 milijuna stanovnika) SSSR poslao snage od 500.000 vojnika u dva ešalona. Prvi (250.000) je odradio posao, a za njim je došao drugi (još 250.000) i tako osigurao pozadinu. U operaziji Z su anagažirali 190.000 ljudi u jednom ešalonu i s time pokušali pokoriti zemlju od 44 milijuna stanovnika koja je površinom jednaka Španjolskoj i Francuskoj zajedno. Nije prošlo i kako stvari stoje i izgledaju, niti neće.
Moram se osvrnuti i na Zelenskog koji po meni sjajno komunicira sa svijetom i traži pomoć koju i dobiva (Lovrić, nije on razoružao Ukrajinu, nego prijašnje proruske vlade koje su zbačene u narančastoj revoluciji). Nakon što su Česi poslali tenkove, a Slovaci sustav protuzračne obrane S300, dao je jako dobru ponudu zapadu: vi nama dajte oružje koje nam treba, a mi ćemo se boriti, ginuti i braniti (i vas). Objektivno, to je zaista sjajan deal. Uvijek je nemjerljivo jeftinije ratovati na tuđem teritoriju (SAD bi mogle ponešto reći na tu temu), nego na svojem. Sad već sve analize nezavisnih analitičara, ali i obavještajnih agencija na zapadu barataju ishodom rata u kojem je Ukrajina pobjednik pod uvjetom da ih se nastavi oprskbom potrebne opreme i oružja. Velika Britanija je poslala protubrodske projektile Harpoon koji imaju domet od cca 150 km, ako se ne varam. To su vrlo loše vijesti za rusku flotu u Crnom moru koja više neće moći onako nonšalantno pucati po Odesi i drugim mjestima na obali koja su još uvijek slobodna od Rusa.
Ukrajina je pokrenula ofenzivu na području Hersona, ali potiho, bez ikakve pompe i najava. Posve ironično, o njoj saznajemo od ruskih snaga koje prijavljuju borbe koje polako, ali nezaustavljivo idu od Mikolajeva prema Hersonu i dalje prema istoku. Obrazac je zasad isti. Po noći se ubacuju specijalne ukrajinske snage i onda precizno navode dalekometnu paljbu ukrajinskog topništva koje se u ovom ratu pokazalo izuzetno sposobno i precizno. Nerijetko se događa da jedan jedini top sa 7-8 hitaca ostvari 3-4 izravna pogodka što je upravo nevjerojatna prezicnost. Preko dana potom pješaštvo zadržava položaj i čisti ga, utvrđuje i onda se ista stvar ponavlja.
Marijupolj je postao ruski Staljingrad (zvuči nevjerojatno ironično, zar ne?). U njemu se ukrajinske snage sjajno odupiru i onemogućuju Ruse da preuzmu kontrolu nad njim. Iako je okružen, noću helikopterima dobivaju logističku potporu i odvoze ranjene, a vjerojatno i ubacuju svježe snage. U tim je akcijama Ukrajina i izgubila jedan helikopter dosad, ali šteta koju te snage čine Rusima je, prije svega u psihološkom smislu, neprocjenjiva.
Namjerno sam izbjegao imenovati ukrajinske snage u Marijupolju Azov bojnom, jer je o tome već bilo tu puno rasprave što su i kakvi su. No, zato mogu ovdje metnuti sliku jednog zarobljenog ruskog vojnika s fronte između odmetnutih regija i regularne ukrajinske vojske iz doba prije agresije Rusije na Ukrajinu tj. početka specijalne vojne akcije kojoj je cilj bio denacifikacija Ukrajine. Slika govori sama za sebe, vjerujem.



Kloba, pital si što nam slijedi? Rusija regrupira snage, o čemu sam pisao. Neke njihove bojne grupe (vjerujem da bi to bile brigade kod nas) su u Kijevu i na sjeveru pretrpjele tako teške grupe da defacto više ne postoje. Ostale su toliko izmorene, demoralizirane i nekompletne da ne mogu samostalno djelovati niti protiv kradljivaca kokoši i pilića, nekmoli protiv ukrajinskih snaga. Čini se da 70 posto tih snaga Ruski namjeravaju poslati u područje Donbasa. Da bi to imalo ikakvog smisla (iako nema), treba popuniti jedinice, neke i spojiti u nove, iznova ih opremiti (ako se ima čime) i tek onda one mogu u borbu. To je proces koji će potrajati barem dva tjedna, ako ne i dulje. Za to vrijeme ove snage koje su u Ukrajini na jugu (30-35 tisuća ljudi, cca) održavaju status quo i teroriziraju stanovništvo, jer za drugo nisu sposobne. Istovremeno, Rusija, izgleda, provodi mobilizaciju u pokušaju da okupi još 60-ak tisuća ljudi koje bi poslala u ovo područje. Tu bi onda trebala imati 100-njak tisuća ljudi, iako će biti krajnje upitna njihova borbena spremnost; ove koje sudjeluju od početka su već premorene, a ove koje dolaze su posve neobučene za bilo što. Da se razumijemo, i ukrajinske snage se umaraju, ali one imaju motivaciju koja Rusima nedostaje (podsjećam na Napoleona: motivacija vrijedi 10 puta više od snage) i logističko zaleđe koje je puno pliće uz podršku naroda koju Rusi nemaju. Rusija želi ostvariti brojčanu prednost koja bi joj zajamčila ostvarenje teritorijalnih ciljeva, a onda možemo očekivati njezin pokušaj ciprizacije statusa quo na terenu.
Ukrajina, koliko god se to činilo nevjerojatnim, u ovom trenutku dobiva ovaj rat. Sama činjenica da se smanjuje količina vijesti koja dolazi s njihove strane upućuje na to da spremaju velike akcije od kojih je ovo stanje kod Hersona samo nagovještaj. Dosad su pokazali i dokazali da itekako znaju što rade, izvrsno su obučeni i utrenirani, motivacije im ne nedostaje. Predstoji nam velika i krvava bitka koja bi mogla odrediti sudbinu ruske vojske u Ukrajini, ali i šire od toga. Vjerojatno se pod onim najgore tek dolazi misli na to.

Dragi kolege, kako je jedan stari dobri trener (John Wooden) rekao:

‘’Whatever you do in life, surround yourself with smart people who'll argue with you.’’

Tako umjesto da vam "idem niz dlaku", a mogao bih, to je uvijek lakše, tjeram vas da malo isključite emocije i pokušate svaku informaciju kritički propitati. U pandemiji smo vidjeli koliko izuzetno pametnih ljudi, kada im se pritisne "the fear button", isključe kritičko mišljenje i počnu kao ovce gutati sve što im se servira. Kasnije, kada se otkrije istina, onda stvar postane nepoželjna tema, a ljudi bježe od priznanja da su bili u krivu, pa sve to samo gurnu pod tepih. I to je ljudski.

Treba uvijek staviti na vagu info s obje strane, a opet to ovdje nije učinjeno, a ne bih niti potezao tu temu da nisu američki pukovnik i stručnjak UN-a za oružje rekli istu stvar - da im je sve to sumnjivo i da ono iz Buče nema nikakve logike. Znači netko na zapadu, tko je sigurno za našoj strani u ovom sukobu, ima različito mišljenje.

I onda mene zanima zašto ga ima?

Oni su profesionalci, a ne političari ili novinari u službi jedne strane, zato vjerujem da stvari gledaju objektivnije, njima su recimo ruski argumenti i objava da oni s tim zločinom nemaju veze i da su grad napustili dan ranije imali više smisla od onoga što se moglo čitati u zapadnim MSM medijima.

Rusi pak tvrde da su ljude pobili Azovci, sve one koje su zatekli s bijelom vrpcom, jer je to bio znak da su "neutralni", a oni to tumače kao "domaći izdajnici" i "ruske pripuze". I ne kažem da je tako, tako kažu Rusi, a ovi Ameri su rekli da je toga već bilo drugdje - da su Azov neonacisti maltretirali i ubijali svoje za koje su vjerovali da su za rusku stranu. I je li to nemoguć scenario? Ne bih ga isključio.

Na kraju, ja ovdje uopće ne govorim je li to tako ili nije tako, samo skrećem pozornost da je to "lead" na preispitivanje što se zapravo dogodilo - jer nema nikakve logike biti u gradu tjednima u miru sa stanovništvom, a onda zadnji dan sve pobiti, a gradonačelnik na snimici vedro govori kako se ruska vojska povukla i ne spominje nikakav genocid. Evo, meni je to čudno, vama nije?

A sav video materijal koji se pregledava kod nas na zapadu je onaj s "naše strane". Kada malo zavirite na Telegram, pa pogledate drugu stranu, sve to dobije neki drugi okus. Kod nas se nije mogla vidjeti niti jedna snimka lutki odjevenih i smještenih da izgledaju kao žrtve. Automatski je to odbačeno kao lažirano. Naravno da i to može biti namješteno, ali dokle to onda ide, na kojoj iteraciji prestajemo provjeravati tko koliko izmišlja?

I dobro mi je ponoviti po ne znam koji put - ne branim Ruse niti sam za njihovu stranu, oni su prvi povukli okidač u ovom sukobu i očito je da je ukrajinski narod žrtva, ali jednako tako ne mogu ovaj rat gledati crno-bijelo i ne mogu gutati propagandu samo jedne strane. Sjetite se što nam je sve servirano za Irak. I što je na kraju bila istina.

I jedno je kada Irak gledate iz perspektive domaćeg Dnevnika ili CNN-a, drugo kada vam šef vojne policije iz Bagdada ispriča svoju priču.

Zato sam jako-jako oprezan sa svakom vješću u zapadnim MSM i za sve što me zanima tražim kontrainformaciju s druge strane, pa onda sam zaključim što je vjerojatnije. Naravno, i to je samo neka moja prosudba, možda kriva u tko zna koliko slučajeva, ali barem uspoređujem izvore.

Pazite vi ludila ako jedan Biden, znači trebao bi biti vrhunski autoritet zapada, izjavi onu laž za rusko biološko oružje u Ukrajini, a onda ga kasnije njegovi vlastiti demantiraju.

A da ga nisu demantirali, mnogi ovdje bi bili uvjereni da je to istina! O tome govorim...